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Introduction 
Whether China is intended to be simply an object of dissuasion or the primary object is a matter 
of continuing conjecture by close readers of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).[1] In 
asserting that "well targeted strategy and policy can… dissuade other countries from initiating 
future military competitions," the QDR suggests that dissuasion can be applied to any country 
tempted by such a possibility. But the QDR also anticipates the future reemergence of a peer 
competitor—and though it did not mention China by name, it hinted at the possibility that China 
might play this role. It observes that "Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-
scale military competition," and believes "[t]he possibility exists that a military competitor with a 
formidable resource base will emerge in the region." Dissuading China from opting for a peer 
adversarial relationship with the United States seems like an altogether different challenge from 
that of dissuading smaller states from competing selectively for military advantage with, for 
example, WMD-tipped missiles. 
In considering the means and ends of dissuading China, it is important also to be cognizant of the 
subtle shifts in strategic thinking evident in Bush Administration documents. The QDR's gloomy 
view of the likely return of peer adversarial relations among major powers is not matched in the 
National Security Strategy in September 2002, and this fact seems to have some big implications 
for how to dissuade. To be sure, the NSS echoes the logic of dissuasion in its promise that the 
United States shall have military forces "second to none," and anticipates "[o]ur forces will be 
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."[2] 
But the NSS was conceived and written in the post-9/11 environment and thus at a time when 
President Bush was actively assembling and leading a "coalition of the willing" to prosecute the 
Global War on Terrorism. In response to the President’s call to "choose sides," China’s leaders 
chose cooperation. Since then the administration has worked to explore the possibilities (and 
limits) of strategic cooperation with China. Moreover, the President then embraced the argument 
of Condoleeza Rice and others that the major powers today have an "historic opportunity to break 
the destructive pattern of great power rivalry" and to cooperate more deeply on "constructive 
agendas" based on common interests, common responsibilities, and increasingly common 
values.[3] 
In this post-9/11 vision, dissuasion's objectives vis-à-vis potential peer adversaries have become 
more subtle. On the one hand, there is the pre-9/11 objective of de-motivating the competitive 
tendencies of a potential future adversary. On the other hand, there is the post-9/11 objective of 
motivating continued and indeed deeper partnership. In short, the US-China strategic relationship 
has grown more complex than the 2001 QDR and its earlier logic of dissuasion suggest. China is 
a potential adversary. Indeed, it is a potential enemy in war over Taiwan, and perhaps elsewhere. 
But today it is also a strategic partner. And the potential to deepen this partnership is strongly 
endorsed by the nation's political leadership. Dissuasion must work for the best, even as it helps 
to hedge against the worst in future major power relations. 
These subtle shifts in the underlying logic of dissuasion, and the apparent tension between DoD 
and White House views, complicate the task of implementing an effective dissuasion strategy. As 
the QDR argued, dissuasion can be achieved by "maintaining or enhancing advantages in some 
key areas of military capability." This may be effective for de-motivating certain types of military 
competitions. But it may likewise motivate other responses, whether asymmetric military ones or 
a general desire to compete in order not to be taken advantage of. Achievement of deeper 
partnership may instead require restraint in the development of some key military capabilities—a 
restraint that seems contrary to the original intent of the QDR. 
How can this logic be applied to China? How can dissuasion be operationalized—which is to say, 
how can U.S. military forces be postured to achieve the intended strategic objectives? This 
Strategic Insight provides some initial insights to these issues, in the hope of stimulating broader 
discussion and debate. It begins with a discussion of how best to define the goals of dissuasion 
vis-à-vis China. It next considers how to structure U.S. strategic forces—defined as all elements 
of the New Triad—with the aim of achieving dissuasion. It closes with some observations on 
implementation challenges.[4]  
The Objectives of Dissuasion  
Within the U.S. defense community, there appears to be a good deal of confusion about the goal 
of dissuasion vis-à-vis China. An informal survey of the DoD community conducted in 2004 
uncovered the following opinions about the objectives of dissuasion of China: 
· Avoiding a cold-war like nuclear arms race;  
· Preventing China's emergence as a peer political power;  
· Preventing China's emergence as a peer military competitor;  
· Deterring a PLA "grab" of Taiwan;  
· Stalling China's force modernization;  
· De-motivating China's efforts to compete with US BMD deployments;  
· Inhibiting PRC strategic and foreign policy responses to US BMD;  
· Inhibiting a future PRC choice to seek to become the dominant nuclear power in Eurasia;  
· Structuring the strategic nuclear relationship with China so that it reinforces trend toward 
cooperation and concert described in NSS; and  
· Collapsing Communist Party rule in China.  
Most of these seem well wide of the marks set out by the QDR and NSS. Some confuse 
dissuasion with deterrence. Others describe a political objective seemingly not intended by 
administration leaders. The QDR emphasizes decisions to initiate future military competitions. 
This seems to imply de-motivating a decision that might be made but hasn’t yet been made. In 
the case of China, this logic suggests that the objective of dissuasion is de-motivation of a 
redirection of Chinese economic, military, and social assets toward major military confrontation 
with the United States, as part of a decision to confront the United States as an adversarial peer. 
China, like most every other country in the world, has neither the technology nor the wealth to 
compete with the United States as a peer on the conventional battlefield. It certainly desires the 
development of selective advantages in a war with the United States over Taiwan—and is 
aggressively pursuing new capabilities toward that end, though in a severely resource-
constrained setting. But wholesale transformation of the People’s Liberation Army to confront the 
United States militarily in the way the Soviet military did has not been a priority of the Chinese 
leadership (military modernization has been the lowest priority of the "four modernizations" for 
decades), and the political and economic factors that would permit such a transformation of 
Chinese priorities are difficult to conceive for the foreseeable future. 
If not on the conventional battlefield, then where else might China opt for competition for peer 
benefit? Perhaps in the strategic realm: for decades China has fielded a nuclear force structure 
far inferior to that of the United States, both quantitatively and quantitatively. But it is now 
modernizing that force. This modernization has brought a significant expansion of its theater 
ballistic missile force. And this raises a question about the nature of the future intercontinental 
force that might be seen as necessary to China’s purposes. From the perspective of dissuasion, it 
is important to distinguish between the current trajectory of Chinese force modernization and a 
possible future decision to depart from that trajectory and intensify US-PRC military competition in 
service of its ambition to emerge as a peer adversary to the United States. 
China’s force modernization plans are, unfortunately, something of a mystery. China has a long 
tradition of military secrecy and indeed deception, and Chinese experts believe that transparency 
in the nuclear realm, as in other realms, only serves to underscore its weakness and thus 
embolden its adversaries. 
But its present trajectory of force developments may be extrapolated from available 
information.[5] Its modernization seems driven principally by a vision of nuclear sufficiency in 
terms of securing PRC interests in a Taiwan conflict under the nuclear shadow. China has been 
working to regain confidence in its nuclear posture by addressing concerns about the survivability 
and effectiveness of its forces. It is working to plug two gaps: one is between the strategic 
requirement to "absorb the first blow" and the operational capacity to counterattack, and the other 
is between the requirement to win in "local wars under high-tech conditions" and current 
conventional operational capacity. U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) has had an impact on 
Chinese perceptions of the effectiveness of their strategic force, but it is not the sole driver of 
modernization and its actual impact on future force characteristics remains uncertain. 
Deflecting China’s modernization of its forces in a way that keeps pace incrementally with the 
challenges to force effectiveness posed by BMD appears beyond the intended scope of 
dissuasion. Here the intention is already well formed, and the decision long made and resourced. 
Indeed, the political commitment to the preservation of a viable strategic deterrent appears to be 
deep and abiding, not least because China's leaders and strategists have expressed grave fears 
about a more assertive America freed by Soviet collapse to exercise military power in service of 
its interests and values. 
Is there a potential departure from this trajectory that seems the appropriate intended "target" of 
dissuasion? Is there a decision not yet made but potentially on a future agenda that would bring 
new military competition with the United States and presage a peer adversarial relationship? 
There appears to be. Rather than pace the development of U.S. BMD with incremental 
improvements to its strategic forces, China might opt to race the New Triad envisioned in the 
Bush Administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. What might drive such a decision? And 
what would it entail? 
Such a decision could be driven by the perception that incremental improvements to its strategic 
forces will not suffice to safeguard Chinese interests in a time of confrontation with the United 
States. Chinese incrementalism is informed by an expectation of incremental improvements to 
the U.S. posture. It is informed also by a belief that a little nuclear leverage over the United States 
will go a long way toward inducing U.S. restraint during a confrontation over Taiwan. But there 
are reasons to think that Chinese planners may no longer see incrementalism as sufficient. 
Future deployment of New Triad capabilities could be seen by Chinese force planners as highly 
challenging to China’s strategic posture. Such deployment seems to promise splendid 
conventional strike capabilities that would make certain forms of threatened PRC nuclear 
retaliation less credible. The ambition for improved nuclear strike capabilities seems to promise a 
U.S. ability to put some key PRC assets at new risk. The ambition for improved ISR (intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance) seems to mean that the United States will be able to find the 
targets in China it needs at whatever level of escalation it chooses. BMD means that the United 
States will be able to run new risks in defense of Taiwan. Moreover, the administration’s defense 
transformation agenda promises to open up the gap between the People’s Liberation Army and 
the U.S. military faster than China’s purchase of RMA (revolution in military affairs) technologies 
can close it. Lastly, U.S. strategic behavior post-9/11 seems to call into question the common 
Chinese expectation that the America is a complacent and casualty-averse society that can be 
made to run in fear when its nose is bloodied. 
If Chinese planners come to see incrementalism as ill-serving their interest in competing with 
developments in the U.S. posture, do they have a realistic alternative? Some Americans worry 
that China might choose the course that the Soviets chose in the 1960s—to build massive 
counterforce warfighting forces in pursuit of overwhelming nuclear advantages over the United 
States and the West. But there seems to be no voice for this option in China. Many look at the 
Soviet Union’s military investment choices of the 1960s and 1970s as foolish and ultimately 
crippling; indeed, Chinese analysts often credit the United States with masterminding Soviet 
collapse by tricking it into an expensive arms race. It is difficult to find even a hint of Chinese 
interest in nuclear counterforce warfighting strategies of the kind that drove such large force 
deployments by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
What then might "race the New Triad" mean, operationally? It could mean a sprint, not a race in 
perpetuity. Chinese experts seem to accept New Triad capabilities as inevitable in America’s 
future strategic posture, but as likely to be a decade or more in reaching the field. In the interim, 
China might move aggressively to improve its abilities to penetrate U.S. missile defenses; to 
target U.S. forces in theater, U.S. bases in the region, and the U.S. homeland; while also 
strengthening its abilities to protect its own key assets—what Chinese analysts call "nuclear 
defense." It would do so with the hope that this race-not-pace strategy would deprive the United 
States of the confidence that it can prevail at low or no cost in a confrontation over Taiwan under 
the nuclear shadow. Then, conceivably, Beijing might create a crisis over Taiwan and employ or 
threaten to employ those capabilities with the hope of exploiting the advantages it has maximized 
but will soon lose (as U.S. New Triad capabilities reach the field). Thus the notionally conceivable 
departure trajectory for Chinese force modernization entails a decision to move aggressively to 
strengthen its own capacities for nuclear and non-nuclear strategic strike and for protection of its 
forces and other assets. 
This line of argument implies that the proper and necessary objective of dissuasion is de-
motivation of a future Chinese choice to abandon the incrementalist force modernization 
trajectory in favor of a sprint to limited nuclear defense and its exploitation in a Taiwan crisis of 
Beijing's making. Think of this as a choice between pacing U.S. BMD and racing the New Triad. 
How can dissuasion of this possible Chinese choice for more intensive competition be achieved? 
And how can this be done in a way that also motivates deeper partnership and strategic 
cooperation? 
Structuring U.S. Strategic Forces for Dissuasion 
From a conceptual perspective, there are at least five different possible ways of structuring U.S. 
strategic forces in service of the objectives of dissuasion. There are strengths and weaknesses of 
each. 
· The first of these is to rely on large numbers of deployed nuclear strike forces. This helps 
to "raise the barrier to entry" to competition and thus helps to dissuade the decision to 
compete in the first place. As one influential study has argued, it might be useful to 
impress China with "greater, rather than fewer weapons… Authoritarian states and 
leaders seem to place special emphasis on larger numbers, perhaps because… dictators 
find in large numbers a promise or manifestation of the unlimited force they want to 
exercise."[6]  
From the perspective of dissuasion, this approach seems not particularly promising. Even on the 
race-not-pace trajectory, China seems unmotivated to compete with the United States with 
thousands of deployed intercontinental strike forces. Of course, very deep cuts in the U.S. 
arsenal could have the effect of motivating Chinese thinking down this route. Moreover, U.S. 
reliance on large numbers of deployed weapons for dissuasion seems to suggest that the 
relevant mode of Chinese competition would be offense-offense, when in fact it would be offense-
defense. In other words, China's thinking about the virtues of a rapid medium-term build up of its 
longer-range strike systems would likely be shaped significantly by expectations of U.S. ability to 
pace or out-race such a Chinese build up with its own BMD deployments. If it cannot out-race the 
US deployment of BMD, why even consider the race-not -pace trajectory? 
· A second way to structure U.S. strategic forces for dissuasion is to rely on 
responsiveness. Recall the Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for a responsive force 
capable of meeting any contingency with overwhelming augmented forces as well as a 
responsive infrastructure capable of out-racing and out-innovating an adversary on some 
course of competition chosen by that adversary. This appears to be the notion governing 
current thinking about how best to dissuade a potential future Russian decision to resume 
strategic competition and reemerge as a U.S. peer adversary.  
From the perspective of dissuasion of China, this approach seems also to fall short. It too relies 
on the offense-offense paradigm when it's the offense-defense competition that seems to bear on 
the dissuasion objective. Moreover, augmentation forces may play a role in deterring PRC 
aggression against Taiwan but have no apparent relevance to dissuasion. 
· A third way to structure U.S. forces for dissuasion is to rely on "defeat." Think of this as 
the model for dissuasion of the "rogues," which emphasizes fielding now the capabilities 
necessary to escape a deterrence relationship with WMD-armed aggressors and 
composing the force so that its advantages are increasingly overwhelming and obviously 
so.  
From the perspective of dissuasion of China, this approach has two problems. One is that it 
imposes on China the military and economic costs of a choice to compete with the United States 
even in the absence of such a choice. What possible benefits would there be to China of restraint 
in such a circumstance? The other problem is that dramatic improvements in US warfighting 
advantages of the kind associated with an obviously overwhelming posture would be widely 
interpreted in China as signaling U.S. intent to exploit those advantages in a crisis precipitated by 
Washington to change the status quo over Taiwan. This could help motivate the race and war 
that dissuasion is intended to help prevent. It would certainly sour the political climate for 
cooperation. Moreover, even if this approach were effective in dissuading China from making the 
race-not-pace choice, it would seem to work against the assurance of U.S. allies and friends that 
U.S.-PRC strategic relations will not become so hostile as to engulf them in a new global divide. 
· A fourth way to structure U.S. forces for dissuasion is to rely on selective competition. 
This is a direct analogy to the anti-Soviet competitive strategies approach of the 1980s.[7] 
This takes a long-term view of de-motivation in seeking to change China’s strategic 
personality so that it never chooses to play a global counterbalancing role to the United 
States—and doing so by pursuing regime change as the ultimate objective of dissuasion. 
By this logic, the United States would compete selectively to gain wider U.S. military 
advantages in areas where the PRC must compete but at devastating cost and in any 
case could not hope to win—all somehow leading to the collapse of communist rule.  
From the perspective of dissuasion of China, this approach too has problems. The PRC of 2004 
is not the Soviet Union of 1984. Indeed, the propositions that competitive strategies brought about 
Soviet collapse and can have the same effect on communist rule in China are hotly contested. 
Plus, this approach seems to work against the political objective of deeper partnership. Moreover, 
stimulating arms races to avoid them seems illogical. And this approach would also work against 
the assurance of friends and allies. Recall here that the focus is on competition for strategic 
nuclear advantage; the competitive strategies approach may have more utility as a tool for de-
motivating certain types of competition at the conventional military level (a topic not explored 
here). 
· The fifth approach is to rely on mutual contingent restraint. In this approach, the United 
States would maintain and where necessary develop the capacity to out-race China if 
Beijing chooses race-not -pace. But it would also exercise restraint in exchange for 
Chinese restraint, modernizing its strategic force selectively in a way that would not 
impose significant new burdens on China and its ability to protect its vital interests—in 
exchange for an understanding that China’s modernization is proceeding in a way that 
would not impose significant new burdens on the United States and its ability to protect 
its vital interests. On BMD, dissuasion would seem to require a mutual understanding that 
the United States will maintain an ability to deploy defenses more quickly than the PRC 
can deploy offenses but that it refrains from such deployments in exchange for PRC 
restraint in the military and political realms.  
From the perspective of dissuasion, this approach has at least one significant problem. Beijing 
may not believe that the United States is being any more restrained than technology and budgets 
dictate—and perhaps covertly pursues escape from avowed restraints. This approach also works 
against the administration’s stated intent to maintain an open-ended, unconstrained pursuit of 
multilayered BMD—and it may be that this policy cannot be squared with the ambition of 
dissuading China. 
In sum, there are various options for structuring U.S. strategic forces with the aim of dissuading 
China. Few of those options appear promising in delivering both the desired strategic restraint by 
China and the desired political cooperation. The fifth option appears to come closest to the 
thinking and policy of the Bush White House, but runs afoul of some other important U.S. 
interests. 
Conclusion  
Dissuasion is a hedging strategy. The United States hopes to hedge against the possibility that 
China might seek to compete as a peer adversary by so posturing itself so that China sees no 
possible advantage down that path. The challenge of hedging strategies is that sometimes they 
create the situation they are intended to prevent. The wrong dissuasion strategy may motivate 
China to compete for strategic advantage over Taiwan. The wrong dissuasion strategy may sour 
the climate of political cooperation now prevailing between Washington and Beijing, and lead to 
more confrontational Chinese policies on regional security, weapons proliferation, and terrorism. 
Rather than make an uncertain security environment more predictable, the wrong dissuasion 
strategies may increase the likelihood of significant strategic surprise, in the form of major 
departures from U.S. preferences in the behaviors of China (and possibly also U.S. friends and 
allies as a result of failures of assurance). 
The right dissuasion strategy begins with a thorough assessment of U.S. interests. It requires 
plans for the development of U.S. strategic and conventional forces tailored to the requirements 
of dissuasion. But dissuasion cannot be achieved by force structure alone. Overcoming Chinese 
suspicions of U.S. strategic intent requires an element of assurance as well, something that can 
flow only from the political dialogue and foreign policy process, something that ought to be 
equally valuable in addressing U.S. suspicions of Chinese intent. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic 
Insights home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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